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The book jacket promises drama. David Kessler, former Commissioner
of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), is said to tell "a gripping
detective story," a story of "right and wrong" and "moral courage." The
"unlikely heroes" are a small team of FDA employees who set out to battle
the "lethal" tobacco industry. Kessler himself plays a role akin to James
Stewart's Mr. Smith.
This was real life, however, and the good guys did not win. Based on its
investigations of the tobacco industry, the FDA answered the "question of
intent" -whether tobacco manufacturers intended to produce nicotine's
drug-like addictive effects-positively. This finding meant, for the FDA,
that tobacco was a drug, and that tobacco therefore fell within its
jurisdiction. The Agency acted on its claimed authority to promulgate rules
aimed at reducing the incidence of youth smoking. These rules, for
example, restricted underage purchases, prohibited billboard advertising
near schools, and banned all but text-only ads in print publications that
t Professor of Law, Seton Hall Law School. J.D., Columbia Law School. I worked as an
attorney in the FDA Chief Counsel's Office from 1975 to 1981 but did not work on tobacco
issues. I also served as a reviewer for a report, INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIS.,
CLEARING THE SMOKE: ASSESSING THE SCIENCE BASE FOR TOBACCO HARM REDUCTION (2001)
[hereinafter IOM REPORT], that I discuss further in this Review. See infra Subsection II.D. 1. The
comments of George Conk, Howie Erichson, and Dan Solove on an earlier draft were particularly
helpful. I am grateful too for Jeanne O'Connor's research assistance.
* Dean of the Yale University School of Medicine.
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reach the young. The Supreme Court, however, taking the position that
Congress did not intend to place tobacco within the Agency's jurisdiction,
struck down the regulations!
Of course, the FDA's battle, despite its ultimate failure to create a
regulatory scheme for tobacco, was not wholly without effect. Its
investigation brought to light information about the mechanisms
manufacturers use to control the level of nicotine in their products. Industry
documents obtained by the Agency showed plainly how tobacco products
are designed to "deliver nicotine, a potent drug, with a variety of
physiological effects." 3 The Agency's evidence demonstrated, as the
Supreme Court observed, "that tobacco use, particularly among children
and adolescents, poses perhaps the single most significant threat to public
health in the United States." 4 Collectively, the information produced
through the FDA's investigation "changed popular thinking forever."' The
investigation also spurred a televised congressional hearing at which
tobacco executives denied the addictive nature of cigarettes, a position that
helped further to discredit the industry in the public mind.6 The Kessler-led
effort, in short, has put tobacco reform on the public agenda in a way that
promises continuing change.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that the FDA's regulatory effort failed.
One aim of this Review is to explain why. I maintain that Kessler, perhaps
driven by the sort of black-and-white dynamics that color the book jacket,
sought too much. He claimed an essentially open-ended jurisdiction with
unidentified aims. Had he argued for a more limited vision of the Agency's
authority, one that, for example, confined itself to the youth smoking that
was, in any case, the subject of the Agency's proposed regulations, the
Supreme Court might have supported the Agency.
When he announced the regulatory effort, President Clinton stated that
the "cigarette companies still have a right to market their product to adults.
But today we are drawing the line on children." 7 The restrictions
promulgated by the FDA did indeed specifically target youth smoking.
However, the FDA's jurisdictional claim, based on the addictive effects of
!. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco
To Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,616-18 (1996).
2. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). Although this
decision and the FDA rule dealt both with smokeless tobacco and with cigarettes, this Review
often refers to cigarettes alone, since they were the principal product affected.
3. DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT: A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE WITH A DEADLY
INDUSTRY 260 (2001) (citing a memorandum by Claude Teague, an R.J. Reynolds (RJR)
executive) (internal quotations omitted).
4. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 161.
5. KESSLER, supra note 3, at 383.
6. Id. at 170-74. Only Jim Johnston of RJR qualified his answer by observing that tobacco is
not addictive because it does not intoxicate. Id. at 172.
7. Remarks Announcing the Final Rule To Protect Youth from Tobacco, 1996 PUB. PAPERS
1332, 1334 (Aug. 23).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1180 [Vol. Ill: 1179
Tobacco Unregulated
nicotine in tobacco, was more sweeping. For Kessler, gaining jurisdiction
"was far more important than" any rule, since any rule "was likely to be
relatively modest, at least initially."' The implication of this and other
comments9 is that Kessler intended for the FDA eventually to regulate adult
smoking and quite possibly to reduce nicotine levels in cigarettes generally.
The breadth of the FDA's jurisdictional claim allowed the industry to raise
the stakes of tobacco regulation to unacceptable levels. The industry argued
that the Agency's findings on the harmful effects of nicotine would
necessitate an absolute ban on the sale of tobacco products, but that such a
ban was not intended by Congress. Whether the FDA could ever have
regulated adult use of tobacco products is debatable, but if the Agency
wanted to leave the issue open it should have done so in a way that made
further regulation subject to independent judicial review, by, for example,
framing its initial jurisdictional assertions in a way that precluded the
possibility of any de facto ban. By arguing for open-ended authority,
Kessler ironically allowed the tobacco industry to inject its own question of
intent, one that looked not to the minds of the manufacturers but to the
thinking of congressional lawmakers.
The first two Parts of the Review elaborate this thesis. Part I
summarizes Kessler's account of the Agency's decision to take on tobacco
and its search for evidence to support its jurisdictional claims. The
summary points out the discoveries that the FDA made and highlights the
ways in which Kessler designed the FDA's effort to regulate youth smoking
as a sympathetic hook upon which to capture wide jurisdictional authority.
Part II examines the Supreme Court decision that invalidated the FDA's
rule. The Court's decision merits only brief mention in Kessler's
discussion, which dismisses it as a straightforward outcome of conflicting
ideologies. Whatever the Justices' motives, their opinions respond to basic
questions about congressional intent and the scope of an agency's delegated
authority. My analysis of the Court's opinion suggests that, given an
agency's ability to adapt its legal powers to new circumstances in light of
the statutory purpose of its enacting legislation, the FDA's youth-centered
rule could have survived had the Agency argued for it on narrower
jurisdictional grounds. In any case, the conflicting approaches expressed by
the majority and the dissent regarding agency discretion, both generally and
in the tobacco context, provide signposts for the FDA in determining its
future role in the realm of tobacco regulation.
Part III considers directly the future of tobacco policy. Echoing the
crusading chords of the book jacket, Kessler makes a stark proposal: He
8. KESSLER, supra note 3, at 269.
9. E.g., id. at 268 (remarking on conversations centered on "the possibility of reducing the
level of nicotine in cigarettes over time, with an eye towards eventually weaning smokers from
the addictive agent").
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suggests that tobacco companies "be spun off from their corporate parents"
and transferred to a congressionally chartered corporation that satisfies the
industry's product liability obligations and sells tobacco in brown paper
wrappers." If, as one tobacco lawyer suggested, the industry must now
"obtain[] permission from society to continue to exist," Kessler seems
unwilling to grant such permission." I argue that his approach is riddled by
too many unknowns, and is also constitutionally problematic, since First
Amendment protections of commercial speech ordinarily preclude a total
restriction on product promotion.
Furthermore, the proposal ignores the advent of new types of risk-
reduced tobacco products, "safer" cigarettes that may help those who
cannot or will not quit smoking. A recent FDA-funded report by a
committee of the Institute of Medicine (IOM) in the National Academy of
Sciences found that these "reduced exposure" products could potentially be
beneficial, if accompanied by an adequate regulatory scheme. 2 Philip
Morris, which is developing a smokeless cigarette, has also issued a new
position paper acknowledging the need for legislation authorizing limited
FDA regulation of tobacco. 13 In the remainder of Part III, I argue that the
FDA should be given regulatory authority over reduced-risk products.
Moreover, even if no new authority is granted, the Agency's existing
authority may by itself permit regulation. Although the Supreme Court
rejected the FDA's broad jurisdictional claim, the Court was dealing with
tobacco products generally, not with products specifically intended to
reduce risk.
I conclude by suggesting that tobacco companies should have an
obligation, because of tobacco's addictive nature, not only to reduce
smokers' risk but also to assist smokers who wish to quit. Most promising
would be industry development and marketing of cigarettes containing
progressively lower quantities of nicotine as part of a graduated program of
cessation. Measures such as this would restore to tobacco users the choice
of which addiction robs them.
10. Id. at 392.
11. Id. at 388 (quoting Steve Parrish, General Counsel, Philip Morris).
12. IOM REPORT, supra note f, at 6.
13. Press Release, Philip Morris, FDA & Tobacco: Why Philip Morris U.S.A. Supports
Passage of Legislation in the 107th Congress Granting FDA Regulatory Authority over Tobacco
Products (Mar. 22, 2001), http://www.philipmorrisusa.com/companyncws/company-news.asp?
press id=76; see infra Subsection III.D.2.
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I. THE FDA's BASIS FOR REGULATION
A. Taking On Tobacco
Kessler claims that he did not come to the FDA with the intent to
regulate smoking. The goal originated, rather, in a staff suggestion that the
FDA "take on tobacco." "4 A petition from the Coalition on Smoking and
Health (the Coalition) that asked for FDA regulation of tobacco provided
further impetus. In an Agency letter responding to the petition, Kessler
opened the door to regulation by indicating that some evidence
"'suggest[ed] that vendors intend the obvious-that many people buy
cigarettes to satisfy their nicotine addiction."' 15 The letter noted that if the
FDA compiled an adequate record, "'it would have a legal basis"' to
regulate tobacco products as drugs. 16 Kessler believed that this letter would
force Congress's hand, compelling it to decide what the FDA should do
either by supporting the Agency or by stopping it."
However, when Congressman Waxman, a former smoker, learned of
the letter, he insisted on a prompt hearing at which the FDA would set out
the case for regulation."8 Waxman's response placed upon the FDA the
burden of building support for a controversial regulatory initiative. Kessler
had not anticipated this demand and was surprised by its short time frame.
Subsequent events further complicated Kessler's 'task. One of the most
important sources that the FDA had relied upon in its letter was an
informant, "Deep Cough," who, soon after talking with the Agency,
appeared on a Day One television broadcast on ABC-TV, accusing tobacco
companies of "fortifying" their products through the addition of nicotine.
9
When Philip Morris sued the station for libel, ABC-TV apologized and
settled.2" This blow to the fortification theory was important, since the
deliberate addition of an addictive substance would have made the case for
manufacturer intent much more straightforward. Instead, Kessler was
forced to launch an intensive effort to gather additional evidence showing
that manufacturers intended that tobacco function as a drug.
14. Kessler identifies Jeff Nesbit, a former aide of Dan Quayle, as the one who first suggested
that Kessler "take on" tobacco. KESSLER, supra note 3, at 26.
15. Id. at 87 (quoting the letter).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 88. The FDA also alerted the New York Times and the Washington Post to the letter.
The Times responded with a front page story, and the Post with an inside story. Id. at 94. Sidney
Wolfe, director of Public Citizen's Health Research Group, privately urged Kessler to deny the
Coalition's petition. Arguably, Wolfe believed that legislation was a more promising route than
regulation, and therefore wished to see the Coalition directing its efforts toward Congress. Id. at
51.
18. Id. at 97-98.
19. Id. at 104.
20. Id. at 104-05, 156, 375.
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The FDA's investigation of cigarette production and distribution
processes occupies a large portion of Kessler's narrative. This is the book
jacket's "gripping detective story," a story marked, in the words of the text,
by "cloak-and-dagger" elements.2 1 Although the details of the investigation
are not relevant for the purposes of this Review, the manner in which the
Agency conducted the investigation is nevertheless noteworthy, because it
demonstrates the difficulties involved in acquiring information about the
tobacco industry, and thus points to the continuing need for adequate
regulatory authority. Kessler hired staff with backgrounds very different
from the traditional FDA inspector's." The new recruits had experience in
the FBI and Secret Service, and could administer polygraph tests. The FDA
assigned code names to informants in order to protect their identities.23
These informants required such protection because, having signed
confidentiality agreements with their employers, they feared lawsuits and
more extreme consequences should their breaches come to light.24 The
Agency maintained that the duty of confidentiality under employee
confidentiality agreements did not extend to law enforcement
investigations, and successfully resisted attempts by the industry to force
disclosure of the informants' identities.25
Commissioner Kessler maintained an active and personal involvement
with the investigation. He listened in via speakerphone to a telephone
conversation in which Agency officials questioned informants, 6 and
participated in other telephone interviews.27 With one informant, Jeffrey
Wigand, he met personally. 2' Kessler's intense involvement with the project
extended beyond the investigation stage. When the regulatory and legal
staff were drafting the justification for the FDA proposal, he acted the role,
as he puts it, of a "research assistant.""' He "almost camped out" at the
warehouse where the FDA reviewed the comments on the proposed rule.3"
These somewhat unorthodox efforts by the FDA and its Commissioner
21. Id. at 184 (noting that when Kessler met with informant Jeffrey Wigand, Kessler's
calendar did not reveal Wigand's name); see also id. at 134-35 (describing how FDA investigators
met an informant in a public place, where he requested placement in a witness protection
program).
22. See id. at 26. 75, 79, 81, 100, 233, 406.
23. The code names for informants included "Deep Cough," id. at 128-29, "Veritas," id. at
174, " Research," id. at 183, "Cigarette," id. at 115, "Saint," id. at 237-38, and "Philip," id. at
115. For the views of "Philip" on ways to reduce risk, see John Schwartz, Reengineering the
Cigarette, WASH. POST MAG., Jan. 31, 1999, at 8.
24. KESSLER, supra note 3, at 134-35 (stating that company lawyers promised a "living hell"
to one informant if he violated the agreement).
25. Id. at 223, 290.
26. Id. at 138-39.
27. fd. at 116-17.
28. Id. at 183-90.
29. Id. at 271.
30. Id. at 337.
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enabled them to assemble a large body of evidence concerning the
manufacture and distribution of tobacco products. The next Section
describes this evidence and the legal theory that this evidence was designed
to support.
B. Establishing Intent Without Express Claims
To assert regulatory authority over tobacco, the FDA had to prove that
tobacco met the statutory definition of a drug: an article "intended" to
prevent or treat disease, or "intended to affect the structure or any function
of the body." 31 Such intent is ordinarily established by express claims
attributable to the manufacturer in the product's labeling, in advertising, or
in other relevant materials.32
But such direct expressions are not the only means for establishing
intent. A finding of intent can also rest upon external factors, the most
important of which is consumer use.33 On the consumer use approach, a
substance satisfies the intent requirement as long as consumers use the
substance as a drug, and manufacturers can reasonably foresee that
consumers will use the substance with this intent. The FDA has, however,
found difficulty adequately establishing consumer use in practice.
34 The
FDA's first tangle with tobacco, in response to a 1977 citizens' petition that
urged the FDA to regulate cigarettes as drugs, marginalized the consumer
use approach. The Agency rejected the petition, citing the lack of any
express claims by manufacturers that tobacco affected the body. The D.C.
Circuit upheld the Agency's decision on review, but read it as leaving open
the possibility that intent could be established through consumer use, even
in the absence of express claims by the manufacturer. The court set,
however, a very high threshold: Consumer use needed to occur
"predominantly and in fact nearly exclusively with the appropriate
intent." 35 Furthermore, the FDA had historically accepted that consumers
31. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (1994).
32. See, e.g., Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345 (1948) (ruling that manufacturer intent
can be demonstrated by pamphlets authorized by the manufacturer for purchasers); United States
v. Sudden Change, 409 F.2d 734, 739 (2d Cir. 1969) (describing other relevant sources of
manufacturer intent); Alberty Food Prods. v. United States, 194 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1952) (same).
33. Judge Friendly, for example, in a case that considered whether certain vitamin and
mineral supplements should be classified as drugs, found that the FDA was not bound by a
manufacturer's subjective claims but could also make use of such "objective evidence" as
consumer use. Nat'l Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. FDA, 504 F.2d 761, 789 (2d Cir. 1974).
Therapeutic use, however, had to "far outweigh[]" other uses in order to count as objective
evidence for drug classification. Nat'l Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Mathews, 557 F.2d 325, 336 (2d
Cir. 1977).
34. Mathews, 557 F.2d at 337-38.
35. Action on Smoking & Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 240 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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smoke tobacco merely for "pleasure," and thus that mere smoking provides
in itself a negative answer to the question of intent.36
Under Kessler's direction, the FDA reopened the consumer use
approach. Concerned no doubt by the need to have a strong showing in
order to infer manufacturer intent in the absence of express manufacturer
claims, the FDA, in spite of the fast pace of its investigation, managed to
assemble an impressive record in support of its jurisdictional claim. The
Agency identified numerous scientific studies that indicated that tobacco
does not merely provide "smoking pleasure," but also affects the body and
brain in ways that cause and sustain addiction.37 The FDA took the position
that, since a reasonable manufacturer would realize that tobacco's addictive
properties motivated consumer use at least in part, these studies went to the
question of intent." The Agency supported this argument with internal
industry documents that indicated that the manufacturers understood
tobacco's addictive effects, and with evidence that suggested that the
industry took account of these effects in designing their products.39
The FDA relied especially heavily upon a collection of Brown &
Williamson (B&W) internal documents that had been "pilfered" by Merrell
Williams, a paralegal working for a product liability law firm representing
the company.4 ° Williams had sought to use the papers in his own personal
injury suit against the company for heart problems, but was restricted by a
gag order because his copying of the papers violated the attorney-client
privilege. The New York Times obtained these documents from a
congressional source to whom they were leaked and published a story based
on them. The FDA accessed the documents through the same congressional
source.4 Their significance in the FDA's evidentiary position is illustrated
by a quote from one of the documents, a memorandum by Addison
36. KESSLER, supra note 3, at 51 (citing William K. Hubbard, Associate Commissioner for
Policy Coordination, FDA).
37. Nicotine in Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Is a Drug and These Products Are
Nicotine Delivery Devices Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: Jurisdictional
Determination, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,620, 44,690-739 (Aug. 28, 1996) [hereinafter Jurisdictional
Statement]; FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 127 (2000).
38. Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 37, at 44,632-36.
39. Id. at 44,687.
40. KESSLER, supra note 3, at 251.
41. Id. at 252-54. The subsequent fate of these documents, although not discussed by Kessler,
is of some interest. See STANTON A. GLANTZ ET AL., THE CIGARETTE PAPERS 6-1I (1996), for a
description of B&W's unsuccessful efforts to use subpoenas to discover the source of the leaks
and to prevent their public release. Glantz, who received the papers unsolicited in the mail at his
office at the University of California, San Francisco, later made them available, after litigation, at
the University Library, and on the Internet at the Library's website. His book is an analysis of the
papers. See also Tucker S. Player, Note, After the Fall: The Cigarette Papers, the Global
Settlement, and the Future of Tobacco Litigation, 49 S.C. L. REV. 311, 322-32 (1998) (describing
the events leading to the release of the papers).
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Yeaman, the company's general counsel in 1963: "'We are, then, in the
business of selling nicotine, an addictive drug ....
RJR internal documents, at one point under court seal in a product
liability case, also demonstrated an awareness of nicotine's addictive nature
and of the role that addiction plays in consumer use. Most significant was a
memorandum by Claude Teague, an RJR executive, that stated:
Nicotine is known to be a habit-forming alkaloid....
Thus, a tobacco product is, in essence, a vehicle for delivery of
nicotine ....
If... nicotine is the sine qua non of smoking, and if we meekly
accept the allegations of our critics and move toward reduction or
elimination of nicotine from our products, then we shall eventually
liquidate our business....
Tobacco products uniquely contain and deliver nicotine, a
potent drug with a variety of physiological effects."43
The FDA, to obtain the RJR documents, took advantage of a friendly
relationship between an FDA staffer and a team of product liability
lawyers.' Although the role of product liability litigation in uncovering
information is beyond the scope of this Review,45 it is worth observing the
symbiotic relationship between the Agency investigation and litigation
efforts. Kessler met with Mike Moore, the Mississippi Attorney General,
and Dick Scruggs, the private attorney who handled the state's lawsuit
against the tobacco companies to recover for smoking-related Medicaid
costs. The FDA's activities "encouraged them" in their suits, and Kessler
found that they were "becoming allies in [their] related battles." 
46
42. KESSLER, supra note 3, at 252.
43. Id. at 259-60 (quoting Teague's memorandum). The Teague memo was cited in the
Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 37, at 44,867-71. The FDA relied also upon internal
memoranda of Philip Morris that the Agency found in an obscure archive in Houston. These
memoranda described research on the pharmacological effects of nicotine. KESSLER, supra note 3,
at 256.
44. KESSLER, supra note 3, at 258.
45. See PETER PRINGLE, CORNERED: BIG TOBACCO AT THE BAR OF JUSTICE 270-71 (1998)
(describing the discovery, in the course of tort litigation, of documents that indicated that the
industry had concealed health information from juries and thereby affected their decisions);
Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049, 2069-70 (2000)
(observing that discovery in tort litigation can serve an educational role by uncovering documents
about concealed health risks in regulated and unregulated industries).
46. KESSLER, supra note 3, at 304.
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The Agency uncovered evidence that the industry not only was aware
of nicotine's addictive effect, but also took advantage of this fact in
designing its cigarettes. Kessler was concerned that the nicotine levels in
tobacco products might be "simply natural products" of plant biology.47
This would have made it much more difficult for the Agency to show that
manufacturers intended nicotine's addictive effects. As a result of its
investigation, the FDA in fact found that different types of tobacco
contained different proportions of nicotine and that the manufacturers could
control nicotine levels in their products through blending." An Agency
laboratory also determined that nicotine levels within a brand possessed a
uniformity similar to that found in drugs, and inconsistent with the
variability associated with agricultural products.49 Tobacco industry
representatives maintained that nicotine in tobacco occurs in an inviolate
1:15 ratio of nicotine to tar and cited this constancy as evidence that the
company did not manipulate nicotine levels.5 ° However, the FDA
discovered that the ratio of nicotine to tar in the Merit cigarette, the lowest-
tar cigarette, was 1: 10, 5 1 and that within the Merit family of cigarettes,
concentrations of nicotine and tar varied inversely. 2 In its rulemaking
proceeding, the FDA explained the pattern of increased nicotine in low-tar
cigarettes as a consequence of the fact that nicotine levels satisfy users only
until they fall below 0.5 to 0.8 mg per cigarette. When progressive tar
reductions in low tar cigarettes had reduced the nicotine ratio below this
level, the manufacturers took steps to boost nicotine concentrations to
pharmacologically active levels.53
In support of its rule, the FDA also identified specific methods used by
manufacturers artificially to enhance the impact of nicotine.54 Kessler had
received from an unidentified source B&W's confidential Handbook for
Leaf Blenders, which stated that ammonia, when added to tobacco,
47. Id. at 118. Uniformity can be sought in agricultural products, as indicated by ERIC
SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION 131 (2001), which explains that sugar is added or leached out of
McDonald's french fries in order to maintain a uniform taste and appearance.
48. KESSLER, supra note 3, at 148-49. See Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 37, at 44,950-
94, and FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 127 (2000), for a full
description of the information on which the FDA relied to show that manufacturers designed
cigarettes to provide pharmacologically active doses of nicotine to consumers. See KESSLER,
supra note 3, at 63, for the analysis of David Adams, an FDA attorney: "Cigarette manufacturers
can take the nicotine out, but they leave it in. That goes to the question of intent."
49. KESSLER, supra note 3, at 132.
50. Id. at 143-44, 152-53.
51. Id. at 147.
52. Id. at 152; see also Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 37, at 45,067-75 (noting the
Agency's grounds for contesting the industry's position on the tar-to-nicotine ratio).
53. Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 37, at 45,068-69.
54. See id. at 45,076-82, 44,970-75. In its rulemaking process, the FDA placed in a
confidential docket the material that reflected trade secret processing methods. The Agency
rejected comments from the industry that the confidential nature of the material precluded the
opportunity to comment on the record. Id. at 45,279-88.
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"'liberate[s] free nicotine"' 55 and thus produces a smoke richer in
nicotine. The FDA also went to considerable lengths to document
instances of genetic manipulation of nicotine levels, though ultimately the
Agency discovered only one such instance, B&W's cultivation of a
genetically modified high nicotine plant, Y-1, in South America. The
project was still in its experimental stages, although some of the genetically
modified tobacco had already been used in cigarettes sold in the United
States.57
The FDA's efforts tended to show that the cigarette is not simply a
repackaged tobacco plant. It is a device designed to deliver controlled
amounts of nicotine to the body. Together with the compelling evidence for
the claim that nicotine in tobacco had foreseeably addictive effects, the
implication of this conclusion was that manufacturers intended nicotine's
addictive effect, and that cigarettes were a combination drug and device
subject to the jurisdiction of the FDA.
C. The FDA's "Kids-Only Rule"
The FDA directed its regulatory efforts against youth smoking, though
on its reasoning, the Agency's jurisdiction was far broader. The proposed
rule restricted the accessibility, promotion, and labeling of tobacco products
to the young. Access regulations, among other things, prohibited the sale of
cigarettes to those under eighteen, required retailers to verify the age of all
purchasers younger than twenty-seven through the use of photo
identification, and limited the presence of vending machines to adult-only
locations. Promotional regulations required text-only, black-and-white
advertisements in print publications having other than an almost exclusively
55. KESSLER, supra note 3, at 188 (quoting B&W's Handbook for Leaf Blenders).
56. Id. at 188-89, 246. While the tobacco companies admit to the use of ammonia in tobacco
processing, they, and in particular Philip Morris, maintain that the chemical's function is not to
intensify addiction but to enhance flavor. In any case, the potential health risk associated with
additives provides an illustration of the need for regulatory authority to conduct a toxicological
review of tobacco ingredients. See IOM REPORT, supra note t, at 224-25.
57. KESSLER, supra note 3, at 194-96, 214-25, 239-44. There is an irony in Kessler's
advocacy for the position that genetic modification of tobacco is an indication of artificial
manipulation of the product. Kessler was FDA Commissioner when the Agency took the position
that genetically modified foods could be presumed to be the same, and as safe, as their traditional
counterparts, a finding that made premarket approval for safety as a food additive unnecessary.
See Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984 (May 29,
1992); see also Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D.D.C. 2000)
(upholding the Statement of Policy against procedural and substantive challenges). The FDA
policy recognized that genetic modification could in some cases raise constituents to abnormally
high levels and trigger regulatory concern, see Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New
Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,990; the genetic modification of tobacco provides a striking
instance of this possibility. The Agency has since proposed a rule to mandate notice of new
bioengineered foods. See Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4706
(proposed Jan. 18, 2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 192, 592).
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adult readership, prohibited outdoor billboard advertising within 1000 feet
of schools or playgrounds, and precluded brand name promotion at sporting
events. Labeling rules required a statement that cigarettes were a nicotine-
delivery device intended for those eighteen or older. 8 The youth-centered
thrust of these restrictions derived from Kessler's position that tobacco use
was principally a pediatric disease. He emphasized the fact that most
smokers become regular users before eighteen, and that one who did not
smoke as an adolescent was unlikely to begin later.59 In his view, long-term
reduction of tobacco addiction could occur only by preventing children and
adolescents from starting to use tobacco.
The FDA's rule did not treat adult smoking. Nor did it attempt to
mandate nicotine concentration, even though manipulation of nicotine
concentration constituted an important part of the Agency's jurisdictional
argument. However, the book does indicate that had the FDA's rule
survived judicial scrutiny, the Agency would have considered additional
restrictions going beyond teen smoking. Kessler and the FDA staff had
discussed the possibility of "reducing the level of nicotine in cigarettes over
time, with an eye toward eventually weaning smokers from the addictive
agent." ' When Kessler first testified before Congress in 1994 about the
FDA initiative, he observed likewise that the FDA might use its regulatory
power eventually to bring about "the possible removal of nicotine-
containing cigarettes from the market, the limiting of the amount of nicotine
in cigarettes to levels that are not addictive, or restricting access to them,
unless the industry could show that nicotine-containing cigarettes are safe
and effective." 6
By restricting the scope of the regulations to children, however, the
FDA greatly enhanced their political attractiveness. President Clinton's
consultant, Dick Morris, saw the rule as an opportunity for the President to
steal momentum from the Republican Congress and to boost his reelection
58. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 127-30 (2000);
Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco To Protect
Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,616-18 (1996).
59. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 127-28; KESSLER, supra note 3, at 319-
20 (describing his speech at Columbia Law School on the subject of tobacco use as pediatric
disease).
60. KESSLER, supra note 3, at 268. Kessler notes that he considered the possibility of the
weaning strategy, but set the matter aside because he was not convinced that there was adequate
scientific understanding of the strategy's effectiveness. Id. This suggests that, if it had the right
support, the FDA would have been willing to use its jurisdiction to mandate permissible nicotine
levels.
61. Id. at 161. The broader ambitions of the FDA's regulatory effort are discernable, too, in
Kessler's recommendation that Congress reject the global tobacco settlement that was submitted
to it for approval, even though the settlement provided for industry acceptance of many provisions
of the FDA's rule. Kessler was concerned about the tort immunity that the settlement provided
and for the restrictions it would impose on the FDA's authority over tobacco. Id. at 361.
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prospects. 62 Morris, after conducting polls, confirmed that the only viable
regulatory route was a kids-only rule; a broader crusade that touched adult
use might be "political suicide."63 In the end, Clinton gave his support to
the Agency's rulemaking effort, and announced from the White House that
the FDA would issue proposed and final rules regulating tobacco.' In his
announcement, he described the rules as aimed at youth smoking and made
clear that they did not address sale to adults.6" With the rules having
survived executive oversight, the battle over the FDA's jurisdictional
authority to regulate tobacco shifted to the courts.
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
A. Kessler's Assessment
The book mainly addresses the development of the Agency's
regulations, and deals but briefly with the litigation that tested these
regulations and ultimately found them wanting. In the cursory analysis that
Kessler offers of the Supreme Court decision that invalidated the rule, FDA
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,66 he focuses on the oral arguments,
which he attended, and refers only in passing to the reasoning offered by
the Justices in their opinions. 67 Kessler says he knew the Agency had lost
from the questions the Justices asked at oral arguments, since these
questions suggested that they did not understand the strength and
significance of the evidence that the Agency had found to show the
manufacturers intended to utilize nicotine's addictive effects in a way that
brought cigarettes within the legal definition of a drug."s He attributes the
loss to the majority's attitude toward regulation, and more generally to its
ideology.69 Judicial decisions of course reflect the judge's philosophy. But
this was a hard case, and one that involved fundamental questions about the
determination of congressional intent and the ability of agencies to adapt
62. Id. at 304-05. Other members of the President's staff felt that tobacco was too dangerous
an issue on which to take a strong stand during the reelection campaign, and argued, instead, that
tobacco regulation should wait until the President's second term. Id. at 305-06.
63. Id. at 322-23.
64. Id. at 333, 353-54.
65. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also Peter L. Strauss, Presidential
Rulemaking, 72 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 965, 965-66, 984 (1997) (criticizing the personal role taken
by Clinton in announcing agency regulatory decisions such as the tobacco regulation, insofar as
such announcements suggested that he, rather than the agency, was authorized to issue the rule).
66. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
67. Five pages discuss oral arguments, KESSLER, supra note 3, at 379-83, and less than one
page the decision, id. at 384. Kessler devotes even less space to the proceedings in the district
court (three pages to oral arguments, and one half-page to the decision), id. at 355-58, and the
court of appeals (four pages to the oral arguments, one paragraph to the decision), id. at 361-66.
68. Id. at 381-83.
69. Id. at 384.
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their congressional mandates to new circumstances and policies. The
decision also merits close analysis because it is the starting point in
determining the remaining scope of the Agency's regulatory authority over
tobacco.
B. Manufacturers' Intent Not Addressed
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, pointedly did not rely on the
tobacco industry's argument that, no matter how foreseeable a product's
effects, and no matter how strong the circumstantial evidence of intent, the
product could not fall under the statutory definition of a drug absent express
claims of drug-like function by the manufacturer. The Court found that it
did not need to address this claim, since, even if the FDA's theory of intent
was correct, its rule failed on other grounds.7" Thus, the FDA's revival of a
broad approach toward manufacturers' intent, integrating foreseeable
consumer use with evidence of manufacturer knowledge, was not
invalidated, and may find application in contexts other than tobacco." The
Agency's broad reading of intent gains additional support from the Court's
tendency, in recent years, to utilize dictionaries in order to identify the
meaning of a text.72 The dictionary here favors the FDA, defining intention
so that it encompasses "'hav[ing] in mind"' and "'design[ing] for a
particular purpose."' 73
C. Congressional Itent and Its Consequences
In the end, the crucial issue for the Court was not manufacturer intent
but congressional intent: Was the FDA's rule consistent with congressional
intent as manifested in the Agency's jurisdictional statute and in the
70. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 131-32.
71. A broader theory of intent may, for example, enable the FDA to regulate a manufacturer's
distribution to physicians of medical journal reprints that describe new "off-label" uses. See
Richard M. Cooper, The WLF Case Thus Far: Not with a Bang but a Whimper, 55 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 477 (2000) (criticizing such a theory). While the Supreme Court's decision merely failed to
invalidate the FDA's theory of intent, the district court at least in part endorsed that theory. The
court upheld the Agency's jurisdiction on the basis of the foreseeability of tobacco's drug-like
effects and of the role of such effects in consumer use, but it found that the statements of
executives in internal documents did not provide a sufficient "objective" basis for establishing
intent. Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374, 1391-92 (M.D.N.C. 1997), rev'd sub nom.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1998), afftd, 529 U.S. 120
(2000).
72. Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437
(1994).
73. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 153 F.3d at 177-78 (Hall, J., dissenting) (quoting
WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY (1984)); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Is
Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common Law Courts, 47 DUKE L.J. 1013 (1998)
(noting that the FDA's theory of intent has strong textual support).
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statutory regime surrounding tobacco? The starting point for statutory
interpretation in the context of administrative agencies is Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,74 whose two-stage test first
asks whether Congress has directly spoken to the question at hand, and then
defers to the agency on matters where Congress is silent or ambiguous.75
My discussion, patterning itself roughly after the Chevron test, divides into
two parts. First, I analyze the Justices' various treatments of congressional
intent and their consequences in the tobacco context. Then, I examine'more
generally the issue of agency delegation: Under what circumstances should
courts assume that an agency has been given discretion by Congress to
adapt a statute in the face of new circumstances?
1. The Statutory Framework
The Court, surveying the FDA's statutory mandate and various federal
laws respecting tobacco, offered an argument almost formalistic in its
simplicity: If the FDA obtained jurisdiction over tobacco, the Agency's
statutory framework would force the FDA to ban the product altogether.
However, tobacco-specific statutes enacted by Congress subsequent to the
Agency's enabling legislation indicated clearly that it did not intend such a
ban.76 To flesh out this argument: The Agency's rule rested its restrictions
concerning tobacco use by youths on its determination that "there [could
not] otherwise be reasonable assurance of [tobacco's] safety and
effectiveness." 77 The Court reasoned that, given the FDA's conclusions
about the danger of tobacco, the Agency, were it to acquire jurisdiction over
tobacco, would have to classify tobacco products as "Class III" devices.
Class III devices cannot be sold unless they have been demonstrated "safe"
under the conditions of intended use. 8 Since tobacco products were, on the
FDA's logic, unsafe under the conditions of intended use, the Agency could
do nothing but ban them.
The FDA argued that, since a ban would create "a black market [that
was] even more dangerous," 79 the Agency could utilize less drastic
regulatory means. Justice O'Connor acknowledged that the FDA regularly
74. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
75. Id. at 842-43.
76. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 134-43. The Court argued separately
that, irrespective of the FDA's ability to fashion some remedy other than an outright ban, various
statutes indicated that Congress intended to reserve tobacco regulation to itself. Id. at 143-59. I do
not examine this claim separately, although I incorporate parts of the Court's reasoning into the
analysis of the above argument.
77. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(e)(1)(B) (1994).
78. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 136 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(2)(A)).
For a similar analysis, see Richard A. Merrill, The FDA May Not Regulate Tobacco Products as
"Drugs" or as "Medical Devices," 47 DuKE L.J. 1071, 1075 (1998).
79. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 139.
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evaluates drugs on a relative basis, approving them when they produce
more benefit than harm. The Agency conducts this sort of risk-benefit
analysis, for example, in the case of toxic drugs used to treat cancer.80 The
majority did not, however, consider this analogy applicable to a product
like tobacco that lacked any therapeutic or pharmacological benefit. The
FDA could not take cognizance of a benefit that arose not from the intended
use of the drug itself but from the failure to proscribe its intended harmful
use. The black market approach was problematic because it relied upon the
"implausible" notion that "continued use" of tobacco was a "benefit," and
thus that "the very evil [the FDA sought] to combat was a 'benefit to
health."' 8 Justice Breyer, in dissent, defended the FDA's reasoning,
arguing that the Agency's safety determination could not occur in isolation,
merely in terms of the risks created by use of the product, but also had to
take into account the risks associated with a ban, such as patronage of more
dangerous alternatives.8 2 On his reading, the Agency's jurisdictional statute
could be read to leave the FDA with remedial discretion in regulating even
a Class III device, so long as the selected measure provided "'reasonable
assurance of... safety.'"
Food and drug law precedent seems to favor O'Connor's position in
this debate. Under the regulatory framework for a drug, the FDA has
traditionally been concerned with intended uses, and has been found to be
without authority to address other uses. Thus, for example, so long as
methadone remained safe for its intended function in heroin detoxification,
the FDA was unable to impose restrictions directed toward potential
misuse, even on the theory that misuse was foreseeable.' And while the
Agency has developed alternative theories that may reach drug misuse,"
the black market argument is different from and tougher to make than a
misuse argument. In the case of misuse, the drug under consideration
directly causes harm. In the black market scenario, the drug under
consideration causes no harm, and indeed is not used at all; some other drug
causes the harm. Moreover, insofar as black market harm assumes nonuse
of the drug under consideration, it is impossible to say that the drug's
manufacturer intends such harm.
The black market rationale is problematic, too, because it provides the
public an unprecedented role in determining the scope of drug regulation. If
the FDA must take into account the fact that consumers may resist a ban by
80. Id. at 142.
81. Id. at 141.
82. Id. at 178-79 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 176 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)-(B)).
84. Am. Pharm. Ass'n v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 824, 828 (D.D.C. 1974), affid per
curiam, 530 F.2d 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
85. See Margaret Gilhooley, When Drugs Are Safe for Some but Not for Others: The FDA
Experience and Alternatives for Product Liability, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 927, 940-45 (1999).
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creating a black market, then Breyer's position on how safety is to be
determined effectively provides consumers with "freedom of choice."
Even if the FDA believed, on scientific and medical grounds, that the harms
involved in the intended use of a drug outweighed its benefits, strong
consumer dissent-of an intensity so high that consumers would turn, in the
case of prohibition, to black markets-could prevent the FDA from issuing
a ban. This may be sensible policy. It is not, however, the current practice,
which confines the FDA to medical and scientific criteria. If freedom of
choice is to become a relevant factor in food and drug regulation, this
should occur in a more conscious and comprehensive process that defines
the role of consumer preference and makes provisions for adequate
disclosure.86
More fundamentally, the problem with Breyer's black market rationale
is that although it eliminates the possibility of an absolute ban as a practical
matter, it does not deny to the Agency, on a theoretical level, the power to
ban. If, for example, it were possible for the FDA effectively to eliminate
any black market for tobacco, the logic of the Agency's position would lead
to a total prohibition on tobacco products, since their continued use would
then provide no benefit capable of outweighing their harms. The Agency
indeed observed in its brief that it could ban tobacco if it determined that
there existed no reasonable assurance of safety. 7
The insufficiencies of the black market rationale support the Court's
contention that, if Congress indeed intended no absolute ban on tobacco
products, such products could not lie within the FDA's regulatory authority.
To determine Congress's intent, the Court turned to various statutes passed
subsequent to the FDA's enabling legislation. This investigation of
congressional intent was also relevant to a second, related argument offered
by the majority: Even if the FDA could, under its mandate, regulate tobacco
products without banning them, Congress had implicitly excepted tobacco
from the Agency's jurisdiction.
The Court pointed to statutes that seemed implicitly to recognize the
tobacco industry's right to exist. The Court observed, for example, that, in
requiring that cigarette labels include information about the Surgeon
General's warnings, Congress assumed that cigarettes would remain on the
market and would not be banned by regulatory action.8 The inherent
plausibility of this reading was supported by the position taken by the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (today the Secretary of Health
86. See Margaret Gilhooley, Herbal Remedies and Dietary Supplements: The Boundaries of
Drug Claims and Freedom of Choice, 49 FLA. L. REV. 663, 715-22 (1997) (offering factors that
should be considered if legislation is to be adopted that allows access to potentially harmful drugs
upon disclosure of their risks).
87. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 159.
88. Id. at 138-39.
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and Human Services), whose department housed the FDA. In his testimony
during the legislative sessions preceding the enactment of the labeling
provision, he urged Congress not to amend the law in a manner that gave
the FDA authority over tobacco. Given the risks associated with tobacco
products, he warned, such a provision "'might well completely outlaw at
least cigarettes,"' an outcome "'contrary to what, we understand, is
intended or what... would be acceptable to the American people."' 9
The Secretary's testimony not only implied congressional opposition to
a total ban, but, more generally, disclaimed FDA jurisdiction over tobacco.
Congressional endorsement of this position was suggested by a preemption
provision that prohibited any federal agency from requiring any statement
relating to smoking and health on cigarette packages.9" Since labeling
requirements are an "integral aspect" of the FDA's drug and device
regulation arsenal, the Court considered this provision "an important
factor" in its determination that Congress did not contemplate a regulatory
role for the FDA." Of course, the preemption provision might have been
interpreted merely as directed at label statements, and the Secretary's
testimony might have been read as a determination that cigarettes, on the
evidence then available, were not drugs. However, it is plausible to suppose
that Congress was, with the Secretary's imprimatur, carving out from the
FDA's jurisdiction some regulatory power over cigarette availability that
might otherwise have fallen into it.92 Against this backdrop, the Court
determined that the statutory framework that Congress erected around
tobacco implied that it had "effectively ratified the FDA's previous
position that it lacks jurisdiction to regulate tobacco." 93
Justice Breyer, analyzing the same history, found it "critically
ambivalent" with respect to the question of FDA authority over tobacco.94
While the congressional enactments could be read to mean that Congress
had reserved tobacco for itself, they could as easily be read to mean that
89. Id. at 146 (quoting Cigarette Labeling and Advertising: Hearings Before the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong. 18 (1964) (statement of Secretary
Celebrezze)). Then-Commissioner Edwards contended that "'the regulation of tobacco is to be the
domain of Congress,"' and that "'labeling or banning cigarettes is a step that can be take[n] only
by the Congress."' Id. at 152 (quoting Public Health Cigarette Amendments of 1971: Hearings
Before the Commerce Subcomm. on S. 1454, 92d Cong. 239, 243 (1972) (statement of
Commissioner Edwards)).
90. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 5(a), 79 Stat. 283
(1965). The preemption was later made permanent, and is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1994).
91. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 148-49.
92. It may be possible, however, to read the preemption provision more narrowly, so that it
does not apply when therapeutic intent is established on the basis of express claims or other
evidence.
93. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 156. The Court also cited a long history
of agency statements disclaiming jurisdiction over tobacco in the absence of express therapeutic
claims. Id. at 144-57.
94. Id. at 182 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Congress was simply proceeding "without interfering with whatever
authority the FDA possessed."95 Since Congress had nowhere explicitly
excepted tobacco from the Agency's jurisdiction, argued Breyer, the latter
reading controlled.96 While Breyer's objection is persuasive, it does not
touch the Court's argument that Congress did not intend a ban, and that the
FDA, were it to have jurisdiction, could not, under its enabling legislation,
do anything but enforce a ban. Challenges to this argument must move
away from statutory texts to broader questions of congressional delegation
and agency discretion.
2. Determining the Scope of Delegation
If placing tobacco within the jurisdiction of the FDA means a ban on
tobacco, then, since Congress has implicitly indicated that it intends no ban,
the Court's argument against jurisdiction is persuasive. A close textual
reading of the FDA's enabling legislation indeed suggests that the FDA,
were it to have jurisdiction over tobacco, could do nothing but ban it. But
the situation is complicated by the principle of delegation. The FDA was
presumably assigned, at its formation, powers sufficient to its jurisdiction.
At that time, however, the available evidence placed tobacco outside the
Agency's jurisdiction. According to the FDA, new evidence suggests that
tobacco does meet the statutory definition of a drug. The Court did not
reject this point; it merely argued that tobacco cannot enter the FDA's
jurisdiction because the ban remedy, given congressional intent, is too
drastic. But Congress arguably may be deemed to have implicitly delegated
to the Agency the authority to respond to the changed legal
circumstances-the new status of tobacco-by developing less drastic
remedies to protect the public.
The extent to which an agency may adapt its statutory authority to new
circumstances should depend upon the importance of the matter and the
relationship of the adaptation to the agency's statutory aims. It is
unremarkable for an agency to adapt its enacting law, with Congress's
implicit acquiescence, to situations not specifically addressed within it.97
The FDA has, for example, regulated genetically modified foods under laws
enacted at the beginning and middle of the last century, long before current
biotechnology techniques were developed.98 The challenge of statutory
interpretation is to determine when the agency's resolution of a new issue is
so far beyond the legislative aims that, even in light of Congress's implicit
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Sunstein, supra note 73, at 1019, 1059-63.
98. See Premarket Notice Concerning Bioenginecred Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4706 (proposed
Jan. 18, 2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 192, 592).
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delegation to agencies of the authority to adapt the laws they administer to
new situations unless inconsistent with the specific provisions, the agency's
innovation should be found to be unauthorized. This challenge has grown
greater in the post-New Deal era, as the concerns that led to the passage of
important enacting statutes fade further into the past.
Neither the majority nor the dissent provided a fully satisfactory
approach to this most difficult and fundamental issue. For the majority,
legislative developments subsequent to the passage of the FDA's enabling
statute ruled out the possibility of pushing tobacco into the Agency's
jurisdiction. Moreover, the Court found, as a matter of "common sense,"99
"that Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such
economic and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion." "
If the Court's concern about impact meant that any regulation that has a
significant effect on an important industry needs a specific statutory basis,
its decision would have constrained to an undesirable extent agencies'
presumed authority to modify their operation in response to emerging
issues."' More plausibly, however, the Court was simply applying an
eminently reasonable principle of statutory interpretation: With respect to
decisions of great significance, it is more difficult to infer delegation. 2 But
the Court gave little guidance as to how to apply this principle.' °3
99. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 133.
100. Id. at 160. The Court classified the case among the "extraordinary cases" where "there
may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended ... an implicit
delegation." Id. at 159. Presumably, the existence of large numbers of addicted smokers is what
made it difficult to believe that Congress would have delegated the power to ban smoking or to
restrict smoking in a manner functionally equivalent to a ban.
101. See The Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968) (upholding the Federal
Power Commission's authority to set prices charged by field producers based upon its statutory
authority to regulate transportation).
102. See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977), for a
neat illustration of the significance calculation. In this case, the Second Circuit found that the
FDA could require food processing plants to remove the risk of botulism from whitefish. The
Agency was acting under its statutory authority to address "'insanitary conditions' whereby [the
food] may have been rendered injurious to health." Id. at 245 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(4)
(1994) (emphasis added)). The problem was that the botulism existed in the fish before the fish
entered the plant. Nevertheless, the court determined that statutory language encompassed, if
admittedly "inelegant[ly]," not just insanitary conditions within the plant but also "inadequate
sanitary conditions of prevention." Id. at 247. The court's linguistically generous reading was no
doubt predicated, at least in part, on the assumption that Congress had delegated lower-magnitude
decisions such as this one to the Agency.
103. The majority's discussion of interpretive methodology gave no express recognition to
statutory purpose. While it recognized that a statute's function is an important guide in
interpreting its meaning, for it, function was determined not by identifying the legislators' intent
at the time of the statute's passage, nor by imagining what they would have intended in the new
circumstances, but by examining the broader statutory context of the relevant provisions and the
subsequent legislation. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 132-33 (noting that "the
words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall
statutory scheme" and that "the meaning of one statute may be affected by other Acts,
particularly where Congress has spoken subsequently and more specifically to the topic at hand" ).
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The dissent offered a classic statement of the broad delegation
position.'0 4 Breyer observed that the FDA came into being in 1938, during
the Second New Deal, when Congress and the President believed in broad
delegations." 5 While he acknowledged the improbability that Congress, at
the time, expected tobacco to fall under the Agency's jurisdiction, he
believed it "inherent in the very nature of a broad delegation" that an
agency can, in light of the statutory purpose, apply general provisions to
existing products when new evidence and circumstances justify so doing." 6
For Breyer, the canon of express congressional authorization would be
limited to regulations that affect civil rights and those with "'enormous
social consequences,"' and would not extend to decisions of lesser import
such as the regulation of tobacco. °7 Breyer of course recognized that
tobacco regulation was a very significant issue. Ironically, however, its
significance made it more suitable for delegation. Although delegation
would reduce legislative accountability, the issue's visibility would ensure
executive accountability through the election process, so that there would
be, in the end, "the kind of public scrutiny that is essential in any
democracy." 108
The Court's position seems to reflect a wariness about the approach of the earlier legal
process theorists, who directed the interpreter to determine "what purpose ought to be attributed
to the statute" and then to interpret the words so as to carry out that purpose. HENRY M. HART &
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1374 (Foundation Press 1994) (1958); see also id. at
1378 (urging the court to "put itself in imagination in the position of the legislature"); LOUIS L.
JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 572-73, 576 (1965) (relying on clear
statutory purpose as the primary basis for statutory interpretation). The legal process approach
finds expression in Judge Learned Hand's opinion in United States v. Klinger:
When we ask what Congress "intended," usually there can be no answer, if what we
mean is what any person or group of persons actually had in mind. Flinch as we may,
what we do, and must do, is to project ourselves, as best we can, into the position of
those who uttered the words, and to impute to them how they would have dealt with the
concrete occasion. He who supposes that he can be certain of the result is the least
qualified for the attempt.
199 F.2d 645,648 (2d Cir. 1952). This position's faith in the ability to discern purpose now seems
perhaps "a tad naive." Daniel R. Rodriguez, Jaffe's Law: An Essay on the Intellectual
Underpinnings of Modern Administrative Law Theory, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1159, 1182 (1987).
Justice Scalia, in particular, has viewed the statutory purpose test as too subjective. See Antonin
Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517
(arguing that the "quest for 'genuine' legislative intent is probably a wild-goose chase anyway,"
since such intent is merely "fictional, presumed"); Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia's Democratic
Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529, 540 (1997) (maintaining that resort to purpose, according to
Scalia, seems "highly ideological" and a matter less of finding intent than of "making things
up").
104. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 161-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see
also James T. O'Reilly, Tobacco and the Regulatory Earthquake: Why the FDA Will Prevail After
the Smoke Clears, 24 N. KY. U. L. REV. 509, 526-29 (1997) (noting judicial deference to the FDA
on health-related matters).
105. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 165-66 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 166; see also id. at 179 (arguing that the FDA should be allowed to take into
account "the realities of consumer behavior").
107. Id. at 190 (citation omitted).
108. Id.
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Breyer's invocation of executive authority points to the basic difficulty
with his broad delegation approach. Delegation assigns legislative authority
to agencies pursuant to a statute. Reliance on executive accountability to
justify deference to an agency's decision infringes upon Congress's
legislative role unless the agency's decision can be said to lie within the
scope of the statute. Generally, the ability of courts to rein in agency
discretion by interpreting statutes in the light of an independent
determination of the statute's meaning tends to alleviate this problem.
Breyer, however, while rightly recognizing the importance of statutory
purpose in determining intent, framed the goal of the FDA's enacting
statute as "Congress' overall desire to protect health," and declared his
willingness to interpret the statute in light of that goal "where linguistically
permissible." "o Breyer thus endorsed a mandate so broad as largely to
eliminate the possibility of meaningful judicial review." 0
Furthermore, Breyer's broad delegation did not adequately take into
consideration the open-ended nature of the FDA's jurisdictional claim.
Borrowing a metaphor from Judge Learned Hand, Breyer observed that an
interpretation of a statute, even if it "gets the words right," may yet "lack[]
a sense of their 'music.' .. In the tobacco case, this analogy reverberates
with the FDA's silence about its future intentions. Had the Agency won, its
victory would have opened the door to future regulation. The Agency,
however, failed to articulate a policy principle defining the direction and
goals of its regulatory program. One justification for broad delegation is
that agencies can use their experience to develop a public consensus toward
a rational policy that meets emerging needs.1 2 However, if an agency can
remain silent with respect to hard questions, it can stall the consensus-
building process. True, it is often sensible for agencies to approach a new
issue one step at a time. Nevertheless, unless an agency at least roughly
establishes its aims up front, it can arrogate undue power to itself by
establishing a jurisdictional foothold in a minor test case, then expanding
that authority in more significant ways. This possibility was especially
worrisome in this case because of the crucial differences between youth
109. Id. at 181.
110. See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 487-88 (1989) (noting that an expansive test for
agency discretion weakens the power of the judiciary to police the scope of delegations and "is
fundamentally incongruous with the constitutional course by which the Court came to reconcile
agencies and separation of powers").
111. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 189 (citing Helvering v. Gregory, 69
F.2d 809, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1934) ("[Tjhe meaning of a statute may be more than that of the
separate words, as a melody is more than the notes.")).
112. JERRY MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE To
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 156 (1997) (arguing that delegation to expert agencies "becomes a form of
consensus building that, far from taking decisions out of politics, seeks to give to political choice
a form in which potential collective agreement can be discovered and its benefits realized").
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smoking, the subject of the regulation under consideration, and adult
smoking, the potential subject of future regulation." 1
3
The FDA's silence also undermined the executive accountability that
was Breyer's rationale for deference." 4 If the Agency could justify its
authority in the most persuasive case, without stating clearly what else that
authority encompassed, the public would not be able to hold the
administration accountable for the later implications of the policy. This
argument seems especially relevant in the case of tobacco. As noted above,
President Clinton, in publicly endorsing the Agency's rule, described it as
aimed at youth smoking, and declared that "cigarettes are a legal product
for adults," and that adults "have a perfect right to decide whether to
smoke." 5 The President's statement here skirted around the very large gap
between the Agency's broad jurisdictional assertions and the much
narrower scope of its rule.
It is true that if the FDA had taken further action in the future to restrict
adult use, the president in office at the time would have been called to
account. This is, however, uncertain; after all, the president would then
have done nothing proactive, but merely would have allowed the Agency to
implement a broad jurisdictional authority already upheld in principle.
Public debate would have been muted, since the Agency would have been
making no novel jurisdictional claim. Judicial review would have focused
narrowly on the question of whether the Agency had acted reasonably.
Given, then, the FDA's open-ended claim, the Court was right not to
apply a generous notion of delegation. In noting "the breadth of the
authority that the FDA ha[d] asserted," '" the Court seemed in fact to
suggest that the FDA may have been more successful had it claimed a more
limited authority. Had the Agency made clear that it was only seeking to
regulate the use of tobacco by youths, and renounced any authority to ban
adult use of tobacco, it might have prevailed. The Agency would still have
built its claim to jurisdiction on its showing that manufacturers intended the
addictive effects of tobacco, although it would perhaps have placed greater
emphasis upon such youth-targeted indications of intent as the promotion of
113. Had the FDA prevailed, the broad jurisdictional basis of its argument would, for
example, have permitted regulations requiring gradual reductions in the nicotine levels of all
cigarettes, so long as such reductions did not trigger a black market in riskier products. Though
arguably tantamount to a ban, such a regulation would havc been valid in that it would have
provided a "reasonable assurance" of safety. See supra text accompanying note 77.
114. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 190 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
("Insofar as the decision to regulate tobacco reflects the policy of an administration, it is a
decision for which that administration, and those politically elected officials who support it, must
(and will) take responsibility.").
115. Remarks Announcing the Final Rule To Protect Youth from Tobacco, 1996 PUB.
PAPERS 1332, 1334 (Aug. 23).
116. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 160.
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tobacco to teens through Joe Camel and similar ads." 7 The Agency would
not have had to fall back upon the questionable black market theory in
order to explain why its regulations did not extend to adult use. Instead, the
Agency would have been able to acknowledge that a ban was beyond its
existing authority in light of a common sense reading of its enacting statute
and in light of subsequent legislative enactments.
The Court's decision established that the FDA cannot, on the basis of
tobacco's addictive effects, regulate it "as customarily marketed.""'
Tobacco of course continues to cause harm. Other approaches must
therefore be considered. Many of the FDA's initiatives with respect to
youth smoking were incorporated into a settlement agreement between the
tobacco industry and the state attorneys general."9 Product liability
litigation is a powerful if unpredictable agent of public health reform.'
Nevertheless, the legislative process obviously remains an important, and
perhaps the most appropriate, mechanism for shaping the future of
tobacco.t2 1 The next Part of this Review considers possible legislative
approaches to dealing with tobacco risks, beginning with Kessler's proposal
and then turning to the potential role of reduced-risk products. Especially
relevant with respect to such products is the scope of FDA regulation. The
117. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco To Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,509, 44,476-86 (1996)
(noting the effect of Joe Camel and other advertisements on youth smoking).
118. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 155-56.
119. The settlement arose when certain states demanded compensation from the industry for
Medicaid costs incurred by the states in caring for smokers whose illnesses were ostensibly due to
the industry's failure to place adequate warnings on their tobacco products. Under the settlement,
the companies agreed to make regular billion-dollar payments to the states, to contribute to a
foundation devoted to the reduction of youth smoking, to cease using cartoon characters in
advertising, and to limit certain other forms of tobacco promotion directed toward youths. See W.
Kip Viscusi, A Postmortem on the Cigarette Settlement, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 523, 537-43 (1999).
For analysis of selected elements of the settlement, see The Multistate Master Settlement
Agreement and the Future of State and Local Tobacco Control (Graham Kelder & Patricia
Davidson eds., 1999), http://www.tobacco.neu.edu/msa/index.html.
120. See Robert L. Rabin, The Third Wave of Tobacco Litigation, in REGULATING TOBACCO
176, 204 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2001) (characterizing litigation as a
"highly unpredictable ally" in reducing tobacco use).
121. Many commentators argue for legislation over litigation on democracy grounds. See,
e.g., MARTHA L. DERTHICK, UP IN SMOKE: FROM LEGISLATION TO LITIGATION IN TOBACCO
POLITICS 5 (2002) (finding the shift from legislation to litigation "problematic" for a democracy);
Hanoch Dagan & James J. White, Governments, Citizens and Injurious Industries, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 354, 424-29 (2000) (characterizing the settlement as a tax enacted in violation of the
democratically established state tax laws); see also Robert B. Reich, Regulation Is Out, Litigation
Is In, USA TODAY, Feb. 11, 1999, at 15A (observing the general tendency of litigation to replace
regulation). But see Hubert H. Humphrey III, State Attorney General Litigation: Regulation
Through Litigation and the Separation of Powers, 31 SETON HALL L. REv. 598 (2001) (finding
the settlement consistent with the Attorney General's role under state law to enforce the law and
settle cases); Jason Lynch, Note, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Role of State
Attorneys General in Multistate Litigation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1998 (2001) (concluding that the
tobacco settlement, and multistate litigation more generally, do not violate principles of
federalism and separation of powers).
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Court's decision does not preclude the possibility that the FDA can, even in
the absence of new legislation, regulate reduced-risk products on the
ground that they are intended to prevent disease.
III. THE FUTURE OF TOBACCO POLICY
A. Kessler's Dismantling Solution
At the conclusion of his book, Kessler presents his vision of the
direction of tobacco policy. He observes that product liability litigation,
rather than regulation, is the "strongest weapon" against the industry's
power, but notes that lawsuits also tend to encourage the companies to
continue operating in order to pay off their liability debts.
22 The state
governments involved in the tobacco settlement also want to keep the
industry in business, in order to collect the payments promised them.
123
Kessler is wary of such incentives, since he believes that, as long as tobacco
is a for-profit business, its use will inevitably be encouraged. Therefore,
Kessler argues for legislation that would force tobacco companies out of the
tobacco business. Their nontobacco businesses would be spun off, and freed
from liability judgments arising from tobacco suits. A nonprofit
government corporation would take over control of the tobacco businesses.
Given the existence of addicted smokers, Kessler would allow the
government to sell tobacco, but only in "brown paper wrappers." 124 This
would help to strip the product of any vestige of social acceptability.'
25
Profits from the sale of tobacco would go toward satisfying judgments.
The dismantling scheme is riddled with logistical and legal problems
that require further explication if Kessler's proposal is to be taken seriously.
Would smokers turn to black markets if familiar brands were no longer
sold, and, if so, what would the government do? What sorts of provisions
for public participation and judicial review, if any, would constrain the
decisionmaking of the monopolistic nonprofit? Is it feasible or appropriate
to shield the nontobacco businesses of tobacco companies from liability for
tort judgments?'26 What happens if the nonprofit generates insufficient
122. KESSLER, supra note 3, at 393.
123. Id. at 392.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 388.
126. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 1-3 (1996) (maintaining
that new techniques that permit businesses to become judgment-proof are undesirable because
potential litigation is a powerful means of controlling human behavior); James J. White,
Corporate Judgment Proofing: A Response to Lynn LoPucki's The Death of Liability, 107 YALE
L.J. 1363, 1406-07 (1997) (noting that the vagueness of fraudulent conveyance law may have
influenced cigarette companies' decision not to spin off their food subsidiaries); see also Charles
W. Mooney, Jr., Judgment Proofing, Bankruptcy Policy, and the Dark Side of Tort Liability, 52
STAN. L. REV. 73, 76 (1999) (stating that "a new debate should emerge about the effects of tort
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funds to compensate the victims? 27 And how will plain brown wrappers
satisfy the First Amendment, which limits even Congress's ability to
protect potential youth smokers by restricting billboard advertising that
reaches adults?'
2
B. Low-Tar and Light Cigarettes: "Reduced-Risk Gone Wrong " 29
Noticeably absent from Kessler's vision is any role for reduced-risk
products such as light cigarettes. And not without some reason. Low-tar and
light cigarettes have been available for nearly fifty years and now represent
a large share of the market. 3 While some at the National Cancer Institute
(NCI) and in the scientific community believed at one time that the risk of
cancer from tobacco would decline as the popularity of such products
grew,' this hope seems to have been disappointed by subsequent
experience. The IOM Committee found that "[m]ost current
assessments .. suggest that low-yield products are associated with far less
health benefit, if any, than would be predicted based on estimates of
reduced toxic exposure using FTC yields." ' The disparity between
projected benefit and experience is in part a result of the way the Federal
Trade Commission "smoking machine" that calculates these projections
claims when viewed through the goals underlying tort law, fraudulent transfer law, and
bankruptcy policy"). One relevant precedent is the silicone breast implant context. For a report on
a challenge to a bankruptcy court judge's allowance of an independent tort suit against the parent
corporation of implant maker Dow Coming, see Dow Appeals Ruling on Implant Cases, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 7, 2000, at N4.
127. Past experience with massive tort settlements suggests, not surprisingly, that equitable
distribution among victims becomes difficult in this scenario. See Frank J. Macchiarola, The
Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust: Lessons for the Future, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 583
(1996) (discussing the need to consider alternative compensation schemes).
128. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 121 S. Ct. 2404 (2001). The state regulation struck
down in Lorillard precluded billboards within 1000 feet of a school. It was modeled on the FDA
rule struck down on statutory grounds in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S.
120 (2000). On some of the constitutional pitfalls involved in restricting tobacco advertising, see,
for example, Lorillard, 121 S. Ct. at 2426, which notes that tobacco use by adults is "a legal
activity," and that manufacturers and retailers have an interest in conveying, and adults in
receiving, truthful information; and Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free
Speech: The Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 150-56, 158-60, which
identifies difficulties under strict scrutiny and lesser standards. The First Amendment problem
might be sidestepped if the legislation were understood not as targeting promotion, but as
targeting the object itself by limiting its availability. See Margaret Gilhooley, Constitutionalizing
Food and Drug Law, 74 TULANE L. REV. 815, 869-81 (2000).
129. John Slade & Jack E. Henningfield, Tobacco Product Regulation: Context and Issues,
53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 43, 50 (1998).
130. Id. at 52 (reporting that light brands "dominate" the market, with cigarettes containing
twelve or fewer milligrams of tar comprising 53.6% of the market in 1995).
131. KESSLER, supra note 3, at 247. For more on the NCI project, see GLANTZ ET AL., supra
note 41, at 155-62; and Slade & Henningfield, supra note 129, at 52.
132. IOM REPORT, supra note t, at 2.
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measures reductions in exposure to tar."' Reduction in practice may be
smaller than projected because smokers compensate by inhaling more
deeply, and because the ventilation holes in the cigarette paper may be
covered when used in a way that increases the amount inhaled.'
34 The
disappointing results may also be due to consumer ignorance of the risks
that still inhere in light cigarettes. 3
Less misleading testing and marketing procedures must emerge. To
account for inhalation variability among smokers, for example, cigarette
filters might contain a color indicator strip showing the inhalation pattern
measured by the FTC smoking machine, and an adjacent clear strip that the
smoker would use to compare her own inhalation pattern.'
36 The FTC
should use its authority over misleading advertising
37 to seek to correct
confusion with respect to low-tar claims.
The FDA may also be able to play a role in ensuring that reduced-risk
products have adequate scientific support. To obtain jurisdictional
authority, the Agency could invoke the theory that low-tar and light
labeling imply a benefit in preventing disease or in stopping smoking, and
thus constitute therapeutic claims subject to FDA regulation.
3 This
approach is rendered somewhat problematic by the Agency's failure, during
the half-century that low-tar products have been sold, to regulate reduced-
exposure claims as therapeutic claims.'39 The Agency could perhaps use the
133. See id. at 67 ("The weight of the evidence indicates that lower-tar and nicotine yield
cigarettes have not reduced the risk of disease proportional to their FTC yields, in part because
smokers compensate to obtain more nicotine and in part because the products themselves contain
higher concentrations of selected carcinogens." (citations omitted)).
134. See Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 37, at 44,963-70 (observing that the filtration
and ventilation features of cigarettes can increase nicotine levels above those measured by the
FTC smoking machine); KESSLER, supra note 3, at 147-48 (describing the design of the smoking
machine and its potential failures).
135. IOM REPORT, supra note t, at 2 (noting how light cigarettes may encourage smoking
"because of perceptions that the risk with low-yield products [i]s minimal").
136. The FrC has been concerned for some time that the current test methods may be
misleading, but believes that specialized scientific expertise is necessary to make improvements.
It has asked the Department of Health and Human Services to review FTC methodology, and has
recommended to Congress that it consider giving authority over cigarette testing to a science-
based public health agency. FED. TRADE COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR 1997 (1999),
http:/lwww.ftc.gov/os/1999/9907/1997/cigarettereport.pdf.
137. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994) (assigning authority over misleading advertising to the FTC).
138. See IOM REPORT, supra note f, at 70 (citing a 1993 Gallup Poll which found that fifty-
six percent of smokers stated that terms like "low-tar," "low-nicotine," and "low-yield"
indicated a positive health benefit); id. at 71 (citing a 1998 study which showed that thirty-nine
percent of smokers of light cigarettes and fifty-eight percent or smokers of ultralight cigarettes
claimed that they smoked their respective brands in order to reduce risk without having to give up
smoking). For the FDA's statutory authority over therapeutic claims, see 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(l)(B)
(1994), which covers drugs; and 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(2), which covers devices. See also Joseph A.
Page, Federal Regulation of Tobacco Products and Products That Treat Tobacco Dependence:
Are the Playing Fields Level?, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 11, 40-41 (1998) (explaining that a low-tar
claim may be considered a disease-prevention claim if the claim implies help with cessation, but
arguing that a claim merely of reduced exposure is more problematic to classify as therapeutic).
139. See Page, supra note 138, at 39-40.
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emerging consensus on the gap between test and practice to justify its
reevaluation of the labeling claims.14 0 If reduced-risk products come to be
classified as drugs, however, the testing and approval requirements that
follow upon such classification may create disincentives against offering
reduced-risk products.' 4 ' Moreover, any effort to prevent deception about
labeling claims for low-tar cigarettes is complicated by the preemption
provisions governing tobacco, which preclude federal agencies from
originating labeling statements on cigarettes relating to smoking and
health.'42 These difficulties make desirable the enactment of a new and
more flexible framework for FDA regulation of reduced-risk products.
C. New Reduced-Risk Products
Creating a role for reduced-risk products in the future of tobacco policy
is especially important because new and perhaps more effective reduced-
risk products are continuously emerging. RIR and Philip Morris are
developing smokeless cigarette-like products that heat tobacco instead of
burning it and contain lesser amounts of the carcinogenic substances known
to occur in cigarettes.'43 Vector, Liggett's parent company, plans to market
a genetically modified nicotine-free cigarette that reduces the carcinogens
in tobacco.'" B&W has manifested an interest in a new curing process that
produces tobacco with reduced amounts of tobacco-specific nitrosamines, a
known carcinogen.'45
These products may fall into any of at least three regulatory regimes,
depending on how they are marketed. If the product comes with an express
claim to disease prevention, as did RJR's smokeless cigarette during its test
marketing period, 46 then the FDA should have regulatory authority under
its therapeutic claim jurisdiction.147 If the industry markets the products
140. See IOM REPORT, supra note t, at 2. The FDA's broad theory of manufacturer intent
could provide additional support. See supra Section II.B.
141. See Page, supra note 138, at 41; see also id. at 34-35, 39-41 (suggesting that device
classification might provide some more flexibility).
142. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(a) ("No statement relating to smoking and health [other than the
warnings provided in accordance with the statute] shall be required on any cigarette package.").
The Federal Trade Commission's role in determining exposure levels based on the smoking
machine could also affect the FDA's regulation. See IOM REPORT, supra note t, at 87-88, for the
operation of the machine, and FED. TRADE COMM'N, TOBACCO PRODUCTS (1992),
http:/lwww.ftc.govlbcp/conline/pubs/productsbaccy.htm, for the FTC's authority over tobacco.
143. IOM REPORT, supra note t, at 93-95.
144. Gordon Fairclough, Vector Produces Nicotine-Free Cigarette Using Genetically
Modified Tobacco, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2001, at A2; Andrea Knox, Nicotine-Free Tobacco
Product Opposed by Industry, Health Advocates, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 15, 2001, at 1.
145. IOM REPORT, supra note f, at 91-92.
146. Id. at 94 ("A Cigarette that responds to concerns about certain smoking-related illnesses.
Including Cancer.").
147. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(l)(B) (1994); see Page, supra note 138, at 40. The new-generation
products that heat tobacco rather than burning it may fall within the FDA's jurisdiction even in the
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based on their reduced levels of tar or other constituents, without any
express health claims, just as it markets low-tar and light cigarettes, then the
considerations discussed above in the context of the first-generation
reduced-risk products apply. If the products are marketed as "smokeless,"
manufacturers may argue that their claim concerns only an amenity, and
therefore lies beyond the FDA's jurisdiction.'48 The regulatory authority of
the FDA in this area remains unresolved,'49 an open question that will
become ever more pressing as these new reduced-risk products become a
larger presence in the market.
Before turning to specific proposals' place in tobacco reform, it is
important to point out that the value of reduced-risk products in general is
the subject of some debate. Some believe that such products are
counterproductive because they encourage smokers who would otherwise
have quit to continue and entice others who would not have become
smokers to do so."'0 The new-generation products, especially, may make
smoking more socially acceptable by reducing second-hand smoke. All this
raises concern, since reduced-risk products, though safer than conventional
tobacco products, are hardly free from health risks.t"' However, reduced-
risk products are undeniably beneficial to those who will not quit, and to
those who will in any case take up smoking. The policy choice is a difficult
one, and could be made either on a utilitarian basis, in light of a
determination about the overall effect of reduced-risk products on public
health, or on an individualist basis, in a manner that would inform potential
users of the options and allow them to choose. 5 2 Legislative proposals
should take into account this two-edged nature of reduced-risk products.
absence of any therapeutic claim, since these products arguably do not constitute tobacco products
"as customarily marketed," the only category that the Supreme Court expressly placed beyond
the Agency's jurisdiction. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 129
(2000). We return, in this scenario, to the question of intent: Can the FDA regulate in the absence
of express drug-related intent?
148. See, e.g., IOM REPORT, supra note t, at 65 (noting a cigarette advertisement that
promised "a smooth satisfying taste with less smoke around you, virtually no lingering odor, and
no ashes"); Christopher Hitchins, We Know Best, VANITY FAIR, May 2001, at 92 (criticizing no-
smoking requirements for bars and the smoke-free policy at the White House that made it
necessary for Vaclav Havel, Lech Walesa, and the late Yitzhak Rabin to go outside to smoke
while on official visits).
149. See Page, supra note 138, at 38-40; see also KESSLER, supra note 3, at 28-29 (reporting
that the FDA debated the regulatory status of Premier, an early smokeless cigarette, before it
failed in the market).
150. IOM REPORT, supra note t, at 2.
151. See id. (observing that the IOM Committee refrained from using the term "safer
cigarettes" in describing reduced-risk products "in order to avoid leaving the impression that any
product currently known is Isafe' ).
152. For a review of the ethical issues of paternalism, see Thaddeus Mason Pope, Balancing
Public Health Against Individual Liberty: The Ethics of Smoking Regulation, 61 U. PiTr. L. REv.
419 (2000).
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D. Programmatic Recommendations for Legislation
While various proposals for legislation and tobacco reform have
emerged,'53 the discussion below focuses on two recommendations
particularly pertinent to reduced-risk products and to the policy issues that
Kessler raises.
1. The IOM Report
The IOM Committee recently issued a 600-page report on the history of
reduced-risk products and the science of smoking. The Committee found
that reduced-risk products "are potentially beneficial." 154 However, since
their public health impact is "unknown," regulation of these products "is a
necessary precondition for assuring a scientific basis for judging [their]
effects." ' The difficulty in assessing the effect of reduced-risk products
lies in part in the number of toxic ingredients associated with tobacco, each
of which may behave differently,"6 and in part in our present ignorance of
nicotine's precise cardiovascular effect.'57 The Committee cautiously
concluded that reducing risk is "feasible," but that the reduced risk
products "have not yet been evaluated comprehensively enough (including
for a sufficient time) to provide a scientific basis for concluding that they
are associated with a reduced risk of disease compared to conventional
tobacco use." s
153. See, e.g., S. 190, 107th Cong. (2001) (proposing to amend the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act to grant the Secretary of Health and Human Services the authority to regulate tobacco
products); H.R. 1043, 107th Cong. (2001) (proposing to amend the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
to provide the FDA jurisdiction over tobacco); Leonard Glantz & George J. Annas, Tobacco, the
Food and Drug Administration, and Congress, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1802 (2000) (criticizing
the FDA's tobacco regulation and urging that a new agency other than the FDA be created with
the aim of ensuring risk rcduction); Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes:
The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163 (1998)
(critiquing regulation and proposing a compensation scheme or the continuation of tort liability);
Paul A. LeBel & Richard C. Ausness, Toward Justice in Tobacco Policymaking: A Critique of
Hanson and Logue and an Alternative Approach to the Costs of Cigarettes, 33 GA. L. REv. 693,
694-95 (1999) (suggesting that the reform scenario may need to consist of "patching together the
best features of a range of diverse responses, and employing an incremental trial-and-error process
in which the lessons of experience are carefully folded into the insights of theory").
154. 1OM REPORT, supra note t, at 6.
155. Id. The Committee classified these products as Potential Reduced Exposure Products or
PREPs. The 1OM Committee also examined pharmaceutical products, such as the nicotine patch,
id. at 95-116, hut, since these products are already subject to regulation as drugs, this Subsection
focuses on the Committee's recommendations concerning tobacco products.
156. Id. at 214; see also id at 215 (stating that some products may decrease nitrosamines but
not other carcinogens, and that another may decrease exposure to carcinogens but increase
exposure to carbon monoxide).
157. See id. at 252-53, 470-71.
158. Id. at 5.
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To ensure adequate regulation of the tobacco products, the Committee
advised that products claiming to reduce exposure to harmful tobacco
constituents or to reduce health risks should be subject to prior agency
review in order to ensure that there is a substantial reduction in exposure
and a scientific basis for the specific health claims.' 59 The Committee
recommended that a scientifically expert agency like the FDA be granted
broad authority to promulgate performance standards and labeling
requirements for older and newer products alike. 6 The agency would also
be empowered to conduct toxicological reviews of additives to existing
products.16" ' The recommended regulatory structure would build on existing
food and drug laws with adaptations that "take into account the unique
history and toxicity of tobacco products." 162
The Committee acknowledged that reduced-risk products could
increase tobacco exposure. Their ultimate value, then, will depend on
"individual and community behaviors with respect to their use." 163
Consequently, epidemiological studies on the health effects of the reduced-
exposure products, and an adequate post-marketing surveillance system, are
necessary."6 A federal agency should monitor these data. If the growing use
of reduced-risk products led to an increase in tobacco-related diseases, the
agency could set in motion "appropriate public health interventions." 165
The need for regulatory reform is pressing because there is an "already
emerging market" for the newest reduced-risk products. 1
66
2. The Philip Morris Position Paper
Philip Morris has also now taken a public position in support of
legislation that responds to the "unique challenges" of tobacco by giving
the FDA "meaningful, tough and effective regulatory authority."'
167
Manufacturers, in Philip Morris's picture, would be required to provide to
the scientific community information about animal and other testing
conducted in the course of developing reduced-risk products. 168 The FDA
could not compel the industry to do epidemiological studies, but could
159. Id. at 10, 208.
160. Id. at l1, 201-30. The Committee assumed that the authority to set performance
standards would not include banning nicotine from products. Id. at 225.
161. Id. at 11, 224-25. This would enable the agency to respond, for example, to the use of
ammonia in tobacco processing that was discovered in the course of the FDA investigation. See
supra text accompanying note 55.
162. Id. at 8.
163. Id. at 6.
164. Id. at 8.
165. Id. at 6.
166. Id. at 202.
167. Philip Morris, supra note 13.
168. Id.
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undertake such testing itself. 69 In an apparent response to the FDA's
difficulties in obtaining information during its investigation, as well as to
the Agency's concerns about additives like ammonia, the position paper
would empower the Agency to obtain information necessary to assess
health risks and to demand that added ingredients not increase risk or
addictiveness.'7T The FDA would also have the ability to provide
information to consumers about tar and nicotine yields from light and other
cigarettes. 1
7
Although the Philip Morris position paper has its critics among
antismoking groups and rival companies,'72 it is similar in many respects to
the IOM Committee's regulatory program. 73 Most notably, the company
acknowledges that tobacco is addictive and harmful, and that "the best
option from a health perspective is to quit or not to start in the first
place." "' In this respect, the position paper responds to criticisms about the




172. Antismoking groups "doubt the sincerity" of the company's proposal, while rival
tobacco companies claim it is a ploy designed to give Philip Morris "a competitive advantage."
Gordon Fairclough, Philip Morris Pushes for FDA Tobacco Regulation, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11,
2001, at A2. Philip Morris points to the tobacco settlement with the states as a factor in its change
of position on FDA regulation. Philip Morris, supra note 13. The company may also be motivated
by a desire for legal certainty with respect to the regulation of its new tobacco products. One
• product with especially uncertain status is a device that is, in contrast to the typically finger-held
cigarette, hand-held. See Nova: Search for a Safe Cigarette (PBS television broadcast, Oct. 2,
2001) (describing the operation of the hand-held product). Whether the device is a tobacco
product "as customarily marketed," and therefore within the scope of the FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. ruling that denied the FDA jurisdiction over such products, is an open
question. A third possible motive for the company's change of heart is the effect of regulation on
tort hability. Philip Morris may see regulation as an ally in holding down liability, since
compliance with an applicable statute or regulation is "properly considered" in determining
whether a product is defective. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 4(b) (1997); see Michael D.
Green & William B. Schultz, Tort Law Deference to FDA Regulation of Medical Devices, 88
GEO. L.J. 2119 (2000) (cautioning against compliance defenses for products not subject to
individual approval); Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049,
2084 (2000) (providing reasons for a "cautious approach" to a compliance defense). Compliance
may also preclude punitive damages. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-5(c) (West 2000)
(precluding punitive damages for drugs, devices, and foods regulated by the FDA). But see Teresa
Moran Schwartz, Punitive Damages and Regulated Products, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1335 (1993)
(arguing that it is inappropriate to bar punitive damages); cf Rabin, supra, at 2073 n.108
(expressing agnosticism on punitive damages absent data on their impact).
173. This is not to deny that there are important differences. Such differences occur, for
example, in the area of epidemiological testing, see supra text accompanying note 169, and with
respect to prior agency review of reduced-risk and reduced-exposure claims, compare supra text
accompanying note 159 (describing IOM recommendations for review), with Philip Morris, supra
note 13 (providing no form of prior review).
174. Philip Morris, supra note 13.
175. KESSLER, supra note 3, at 391. Kessler includes several discussions of the wisdom of
the strategy. id. at 252 (reporting the recommendation by Addison Yeaman, the B&W general
counsel, that the company disclose smoking hazards so that it could openly conduct scientific
research directed at eliminating the toxic compounds); id. at 228-29 (describing the view of S.J.
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on "the right of adults to smoke," and urges that, so long as society
"continues to respect the values of tolerance and freedom, the decision as to
whether or not to smoke should be left to individual adults." 176
Consequently, the company would oppose any legislation that would ban
tobacco or "achieve a de facto prohibition by systematically imposing ever-
lower tar and nicotine yields that would render the product unpalatable to
adult smokers." 1'7
IV. CONCLUSION
In describing the direction of future tobacco policy in the aftermath of
the FDA's failed regulatory attempt, this Review has focused heavily on
reduced-risk products. Smokers may most effectively reduce risk by
ceasing to smoke. The problem, of course, is that while deciding to smoke
may be, as Philip Morris contends, "an adult choice, "'8 nicotine's
addictive character tends, as Kessler observes, to "rob[] people of
choice." 179 Though some smokers manage to quit after repeated attempts,
most fail. 80 Philip Morris recognizes an obligation to operate in a manner
that conforms to "society's expectations of what a responsible cigarette
manufacturer should be." ' The industry, as responsible marketers of an
addictive product, ought properly to aid smokers who desire to quit. If
smoking is acceptable because it is an adult choice, the industry must
Green, a British tobacco executive, that "it would be best to be in a position to say in public what
was believed in private"); id. at 370-71 (referring to the "quandary" of a tobacco lawyer
concerned that admitting the harmfulness of smoking would lead to liability for the industry, and
even criminal charges); id. at 367-70 (discussing theories of legal ethics). The American Bar
Association's recent proposals to expand lawyers' ability to disclose client's confidences when
necessary to prevent "reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm" has been criticized for
its uncertain application in the tobacco context. It is an open question, for example, whether it
permits disclosure of a change in nicotine levels that "causes three extra deaths over 30 years."
Sarah Boxer, Lawyers Are Asking, How Secret Is a Secret?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2001, at B7
(quoting attorney Lawrence J. Fox).
176. Philip Morris, supra note 13.
177. id.
178. Id.
179. KESSLER, supra note 3, at 155. Both the definition and the extent of nicotine addiction
are matters of debate. For various definitions of addiction, see Jurisdictional Statement, supra note
37, at 44,719-27; and KESSLER, supra note 3, at 120, 160, 172.
180. Though the industry cites a fifty percent quit rate, this figure does not take into account
the length of time and the number of attempts that a successful cessation may require. See Hanson
& Logue, supra note 153, at 1195. Justice Breyer cited FDA data indicating that only 2.5% of
smokers successfully quit each year, even though 70% say they would like to quit and 34%
actually attempt to quit. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 191 (2000)
(Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Kenneth E. Warner, Reducing Harm to Smokers: Methods, Their
Effectiveness, and the Role of Policy, in REGULATING TOBACCO, supra note 120, at 111, 115
(noting that less than three percent of smokers quit each year, and that of those who go "cold
turkey," the success rate is only ten percent).
181. Philip Morris, supra note 13.
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ensure that this choice remains continually viable by preventing addiction
from foreclosing the nonsmoking option.
Drastic cessation measures are of questionable value,1 82 and threaten to
give rise to black markets in riskier products. Slower and smaller measures
show more promise. Pharmaceutical companies have developed various
products useful in nicotine replacement therapy, such as nicotine gum, the
patch, and inhalers, and have also made strides toward nonnicotine drug
treatment.18 3 Smokers must be made more aware of these alternatives. In its
position paper, Philip Morris expresses support for some other cessation-
directed policies. For example, the company would have the FDA sponsor
research on various cessation techniques and utilize the results to guide
smokers wishing to quit. 4 The position paper also would give the FDA the
authority to require that the packaging of tobacco products indicate tar and
nicotine content.185 This information would enable users to develop their
own plans for reducing and ending tobacco use. The problem with the latter
approach, however, is that while low-tar and low-nicotine cigarettes exist,
they do not reach levels sufficiently low to permit smokers easily to quit,
and an express goal of cessation does not accompany their sale. One
promising possibility, therefore, is the development of a staged reduction
program. Cigarette manufacturers would produce cigarettes containing
varying quantities of nicotine, and market them as cessation aids."86
The defeat of the FDA's Kessler-led effort to obtain general jurisdiction
over tobacco hardly spells the end of tobacco reform. On the contrary, the
Agency's attempt, by raising awareness of tobacco's dangers among the
public and intensifying pressure upon the industry, promises to accelerate
the pace of change. Tobacco reform should move forward along two fronts.
Those willing to quit should be aided and encouraged through the continued
development and marketing of cessation products and programs. Those
unwilling to quit should have informed access to reduced-risk products. The
FDA should ensure the efficacy of movements on both fronts. For this, new
legislation expanding its jurisdiction may be necessary. In the absence of
182. See Warner, supra note 180, at 136 (reporting that a proposal for phasing out nicotine
across the board has been criticized on the ground that it could lead to compensatory smoking).
183. Id. at 115-16.
184. Philip Morris, supra note 13.
185. Id. The preemption provision denies the FDA such authority at the present moment. See
supra text accompanying note 90.
186. Such staged cigarettes would, of course, require testing to ensure effectiveness. See
Page, supra note 138, at 16-19, 33-36 (discussing the regulatory status and testing standards for
cessation products sold as drugs). Accurately determining, in the light of smoker behavior, the
overall consequences of new products on public health involves confronting questions that are
unanswered and, perhaps, unanswerable. See Warner, supra note 180, at 136 (noting that some
questions are "possibly not subject to definitive answers"); see also KESSLER, supra note 3, at
236-37 (noting with respect to a denicotinized cigarette called Next that while some users found it
helpful in quitting, most merely compensated by smoking more cigarettes, and eventually
abandoned Next entirely).
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such legislation, however, the Supreme Court's decision in FDA v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp. arguably allows the Agency to assert control
over reduced-risk products on the basis of its existing authority with respect
to disease prevention claims. The failure of the FDA's ambitious
jurisdictional claim need not hamper tobacco reform; it only forces such
reform to pursue the more defined goals of reducing risk and encouraging
cessation.
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